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This paper offers a new theoretical approach to urban squatting, reflecting the view that 
squatters and formal residents compete for land within a city. The key implication of this view 
is that squatters “squeeze” the formal market, raising the price paid by formal residents. The 
squatter organizer, however, ensures that this squeezing is not too severe, since otherwise the 
formal price will rise to a level that invites eviction by landowners (defensive expenditures by 
squatter households also help to forestall eviction). Because eviction is thus absent in 
equilibrium, the model differs crucially from previous analytical frameworks, where eviction 
occurs with some probability. 
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1. Introduction
Informality of land tenure is usually a key characteristic of urban slums in the cities of
developing countries. Informal tenure often involves squatting, where households occupy a
parcel of land that belongs to someone else while paying no ﬁnancial compensation. Given that
940 million people—over 30% of the world urban population—are estimated to live in slums
(UN-Habitat, 2003), it is reasonable to think that several hundred million people worldwide
live under informal land tenure, and that many of them are squatters. Although there are no
consolidated ﬁgures on the extent of squatting, case studies often point to signiﬁcant numbers.
In the city of Dhaka, Bangladesh, for instance, squatter settlements are estimated to provide
as much as 15% of the housing stock (World Bank, 2007).
While much anecdotal evidence about the daily lives of squatters and the organization of
squatter settlements has accumulated (see Neuwirth, 2004, or Davis, 2006, for recent popular
references), a few general observations can also be made. First, squatting is always associated
with crowding, yielding very high population densities. Second, squatted land is usually not
developed or serviced, leading to highly restricted and congested access to basic services for
squatters. Third, while squatting is often thought to occur on vacant public land, much
squatting also occurs on private property (see Buckley and Kalarickal, 2006, World Bank,
2007, Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2004, and Di Tella, et al. 2007). The vacant private land
that attracts squatters may be vacant for several reasons, including speculative land-holding
when disorganized ﬁnancial markets constrain other opportunities for investment, or because
of regulatory requirements or rent controls that make investing on that land unproﬁtable
(Jimenez, 1984). Finally, although squatters do not pay formal rent to an owner, they incur
costs associated with squatting, including possible payments made to a community “leader”
1(Lanjouw and Levy, 2002, World Bank, 2007).
Aside from these general tendencies, not much is known concerning the economic mecha-
nisms that lead to the emergence and sustainability of squatting. The scope and persistence of
squatting thus remain puzzling issues. Suggested explanations usually point to some external
constraints or market imperfections as causes of squatting. For some authors, the main culprit
is the unresponsiveness of housing supply, reﬂecting a variety of obstacles that include un-
derinvestment in infrastructure, monopolies that control the availability of land (World Bank,
1993), topographical constraints, or mismanagement of public land development (World Bank,
2007). More provocatively, other observers stress the possible unwillingness of the private sec-
tor to respond to the low end of the market, which leaves the poor with no other options aside
from informal housing. Others blame the existence of land-use interventions such as zoning
that artiﬁcially increase the cost of formal housing and thus act as an invitation to squatting
(Duranton, 2007). Discrimination in land and housing markets may also bar a signiﬁcant
fraction of the population, who are often migrants of rural origin, from entry into the formal
market. Lastly, local governments may be unable to enforce the property rights of owners,
or they may simply tolerate squatting, either because evictions are too politically costly or
because of a desire to ensure some degree of tenure security for squatters. This latter view
matches a remark in a World Bank report, which states that “most governments, unwilling to
engage in mass evictions, have gradually condoned existing squatter housing while attempting
to resist further squatting” (World Bank, 1993).
Even though these ideas are potentially useful, a formal theory of squatting can provide
deeper insight into this important phenomenon. The purpose of the present paper is to oﬀer
such a theory, building on a small existing theoretical literature. The paper aims to provide a
conceptual framework for analyzing some key issues related to squatting: How does squatting
come into existence? How is the extent of squatting in a particular city determined? How do
squatters interact with the formal housing market? What is the link between squatting and the
prices of formal housing and land? How do policies targeted at squatters aﬀect formal dwellers?
The paper is based on the view that formal tenure and squatting represent two interlinkedland
uses within a single market and should be modeled as such. The model portrays squatters as
2“squeezing” the formal market by occupying land that could be developed for formal use.
While this squeezing raises the formal price, too much price escalation invites eviction, and
squatter communities are organized taking this threat into account.
In the small previous literature on the economics of squatting, some papers focus on the
impact of eviction uncertainty on squatter behavior (their investment in housing capital),
while others focus on landowner eviction decisions. An early contribution by Jimenez (1985)
belongs to the ﬁrst category. In the formal sector of his model, households must pay an
exogenous rent, while squatters avoid a rental payment but incur other costs. These costs
include an occupancy cost, which depends on the total squatter population, an outlay for
“defensive” expenditures meant to protect the squatter’s land, and a cost arising from possible
loss of the housing investment in the event of eviction. The equilibrium requires households
to be indiﬀerent between formal tenure and squatting. The government evicts a fraction of
squatter households, with this fraction matching the eviction probability that squatters use in
computing their expected loss. Eviction costs per household rise with defensive expenditures
and the number of squatters, and total costs must be covered by a ﬁxed eviction budget. The
equilibrium determines an eviction probability (fraction evicted) and an overall size for the
squatter population. Jimenez carries out comparative-static analysis with his model, while
also investigating the impact of squatter coalitions.
The present analysis adopts aspects of Jimenez’s approach while introducing some key
diﬀerences. Following Jimenez, defensive expenditures play a key role in the model, and
eviction costs are also increasing in the size of the squatter population. However, in contrast
to Jimenez’s model, where the formal housing price is a parameter with no important role
in the analysis, the formal price in the present model is endogenous and determined by the
squeezing mechanism described above. Moreover, although the threat of eviction is present,
actual evictions never occur, unlike in Jimenez’s model. The reason is that the squatter
“organizer,” who governs the squatter group, sets the squatter population size, individual land
consumption, and level of defensive expenditures to insure that the cost of eviction is high
enough relative to the landowner’s gain (which depends on the formal price) to make eviction
unattractive. The organizer’s goal is to maximize squatter utility subject to this “no-eviction”
3constraint.1 The model is thus a general equilibrium framework where squatters and formal
households compete for the same land, with squatter decisions crafted so as not to invite
eviction.
Since a model should be realistic to be useful, some evaluation of the realism of three key
elements in the present framework is needed. First, although squatter evictions occur in reality,
the fact that their volume is small relative to the large stock of squatter households justiﬁes
a model where evictions are absent in equilibrium (see Flood (2006) for eviction ﬁgures for
several cities). Second, although squatting often occurs on public land not eligible for private
development, squatting on private land is common enough (as explained above) to validate
a model where squatters squeeze the formal market. Third, the presence in the model of a
squatter organizer with substantial power to control the behavior of his group matches some
real-world evidence. Examples of such organizers are common, including community bosses
in Ecuador, shack lords in South Africa, or Mastaans in Bangladesh. A recent World Bank
study on Dhaka (World Bank, 2007) noted that Mastaans “are self appointed leaders who set
up committees, maintain links and have patronage from local and national political leaders,
government oﬃcials and local law enforcing agencies.” In line with the model’s assumptions,
Mangin (1967) noticed some forty years ago that associations in the squatter settlements of
Peru “do seem to be able to control, to a certain extent, who will be members of the invasion
group and the new residents.” Organizers of land invasions also often collect payments from
squatters in return for “ownership” of their plot, matching the defensive expenditures that
play a key role in the model.
In addition to providing a new picture of the mechanisms underlying squatting, the paper’s
conceptual framework allows investigation of the general equilibrium eﬀects of “formalization”
policies, which require squatters to become formal residents, paying rent for the land they
occupy.2 The resulting analysis oﬀers a new perspective given that the literature previously
focused on various eﬀects of formalization (improvement in tenure security, labor-market par-
ticipation, access to credit, and health outcomes) but remained silent about impacts in the
land market. Since opponents of sweeping formalization programs have noted that squatters
may lose when faced with the full market prices for housing, such impacts are important. The
4model illuminates this issue, exposing squatter losses from formalization and showing that the
gains of existing formal residents are suﬃcient to compensate them. The analysis thus points
to a Pareto-improving way of escaping a city’s squatter equilibrium.
Before proceeding to the analysis, the other contributions to the earlier squatting literature
require some comment. Empirical work by Jimenez (1984) and Friedman, Jimenez and Mayo
(1988) explores the eﬀect of tenure insecurity on the price of informal housing. The results
show that tenure security is valued, which provides one justiﬁcation for formalization policies.
Two other theoretical papers diﬀer from Jimenez (1985) by endogenizing the eviction decision,
as noted above. Rather than determining the volume of evictions via a ﬁxed eviction-cost
budget (as does Jimenez), landowners in Turnbull (2004) compare the formal price to the cost
of eviction, as in the present model. Turnbull’s formal price is exogenous (squeezing is absent),
but since it is stochastic, evictions are generated with some probability. Hoy and Jimenez
(1991) analyze a model with a similar structure.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the analysis of the
basic model, includingthe analysis of formalization policies. Section 3 makes a key modiﬁcation
to the model by assuming that, although the squatter organizer can dictate the choices of his
group, he cannot control the size of the squatter population, which is determined by free
migration. Section 4 oﬀers conclusions.
2. Basic Model
2.1. The setup
The analysis relies on a stylized model of a city containing both squatters and residents of
formal housing. The ﬁrst assumption is that the city’s land area is ﬁxed at L. A variable land
area could be introduced by making the model explicitly spatial, relying on a monocentric
framework with commuting to a central workplace, or by assuming that the city faces an
upward-sloping supply curve of land while suppressing any explicit spatial structure. Given
that the main message of the analysis is independent of any particular assumptions on land
supply, the ﬁxed-land-area assumption is adopted for its simplicity. Inaddition, land is assumed
to be homogeneous, so that diﬀerential job access is ignored. Another potentially important
5aspect of land heterogeneity is also suppressed at the outset of the analysis: infrastructure
provision, or “servicing” of the land (public utilities, streets, etc.). Formal areas are typically
serviced, while squatter areas are not, and the eﬀect of this diﬀerence is considered once the
basic analysis is complete.
Letting Ls and Lf denote the land occupied by squatters and residents of formal housing,
respectively, the requirement that the available urban land is fully occupied can be written
Ls + Lf = L. (1)
Overall land consumption by the two resident groups depends on their individual land con-
sumption levels, which are in turn tied to consumption of housing. For simplicity, housing and
land consumption are equated, with the structure component of housing suppressed. Therefore,
housing consumption for a squatter household is equal to its consumption of land, denoted qs,
with qf denoting land (housing) consumption by a formal household. Introduction of housing
capital would add inessential complexity to the model, with no change in its substance.
Letting Ns denote the number of squatter households, the squatter land area must satisfy
Nsqs = Ls. (2)
While Ns is an endogenous variable in the model, the size of the city’s formal population is
ﬁxed, with its value denoted Nf. Even though both population sizes would be endogenous in a
richer model, this assumption allows the analysis to focus on the impact of squatter migration
into a city with an established formal population. The formal land area must then satisfy
Nfqf = Lf. (3)
The incomes of squatters and formal households are denoted ys and yf, respectively. Given
that squatters may be more likely than formal residents to hold inferior jobs or to be unem-
ployed, ys ≤ yf is assumed to hold, with equality corresponding to the case where job quality
6for the two groups is equal. The main diﬀerence between squatters and formal households
lies, of course, in their relations with the city’s landowners, who are assumed to be absentee.3
While a squatter household occupies the land for free, a formal household pays rent to the
owner of the land it occupies, with pf denoting the rent per unit of formal land. As a result,
the individual consumption level qf is connected to pf via the household’s housing demand
function df(·), satisfying the relationship
qf = df(pf). (4)
With their land being occupied for free, land consumption by individual squatters is not
governed by a demand function in the usual way. The level of qs is instead determined in
an entirely diﬀerently fashion, which constitutes the main innovation of the paper. To begin
the discussion, recall that squatters use a portion of their income for “defensive” expenditures,
whichare designed to raise the cost of evictionby landlords. These expenditurescould consist of
bribes paid to politicians, designed to undercut government support for eviction. Alternatively,
the expenditures could cover the cost of legitimate political organizing, or perhaps payments
to neighborhood “security” personnel. Like landlords, the recipients of any income generated
by defensive expenditures are assumed to live outside the city.
The cost of eviction is then an increasing function of defensive expenditures per household,
denoted A. Since the opposition to evictionsis more forceful the larger is the size of the squatter
group, eviction cost also rises with Ns, holding A ﬁxed.4 Letting k denote an institutional
parameter measuring the diﬃculty of property-rights enforcement in the economy, eviction
cost can then be written e(A,Ns,k), with the eﬀect of k positive.
This eviction cost is expressed on a per-unit-of-land basis, so that e(A,Ns,k) gives the
cost of squatter removal for each unit of occupied land. The landowner’s gain from eviction
is the rental income earned when the seized land is rented in the formal sector, equal to pf.
Therefore, in order for landowners to ﬁnd eviction unattractive, the inequality
pf ≤ e(A,Ns,k) (5)
7must hold.5 This condition is the “no-eviction” constraint.
As explained in the introduction, the squatter population is governed by a community
organizer, who has the power to dictate defensive expenditures A as well as the plot size qs. In
addition, the organizer is initially assumed to control the size Ns of the squatter population, an
assumption that is relaxed below. The organizer’s goal is to choose these variables to maximize
the common utility level of squatter households, who share the same well-behaved preferences.
Let u(xs,qs) denote squatter utility as a function of the consumption of housing (land) and a
composite non-housing good x. Then, using the budget constraint xs+A = ys, the community
organizer’s goal is to maximize
u(ys − A,qs) (6)
by choice of A, qs and Ns subject to (1)–(5). Given the desirability of setting A at the smallest
possible value, the inequality in (5) will hold as an equality at the optimum and can be treated
as such in the maximization problem. The maximal value of (6) is assumed to be larger than
the rural utility level, denoted e u, so that the organizer faces a willing supply of squatters.
The nature of the problem faced by the squatter organizer can be seen by considering
the various constraints along with the objective function in (6). First, as mentioned above,
setting A at a low value raises xs, but the resulting decline in e(A,Ns,k) invites eviction by
landowners. In addition, for given Ns, allowing the plot size qs to expand raises squatter utility
but further squeezes the formal housing sector by raising Ls. The resulting drop in Lf then
leads to an increase in the formal rent pf, again inviting eviction by landowners. Similarly,
while a higher Ns reduces the threat of eviction, allowing a reduction in A, it leads to the same
squeezing eﬀect as an increase in qs, and the resulting increase in pf reverses the decline in the
eviction threat. The squatter organizer must balance these various eﬀects, choosing the best
values of the decision variables while ensuring satisfaction of the no-eviction constraint in (5).
2.2 Optimality conditions
To solve the organizer’s optimization problem, the ﬁve constraints in (1)–(5) can be col-
lapsed to a smaller number. First, using (4) and (5), qf can be written as qf = df(e(A,Ns,k)).
Then combining (1)–(3) yields Nsqs = L − Nfqf, and substituting the previous solution and
8solving for qs yields
qs =
L − N fdf(e(A,Ns,k))
Ns
. (7)








which is maximized by choice of A and Ns.










where superscripts denote partial derivatives. This condition says that the loss from less xs due
to a marginal increase in A (given by ux) should equal the gain from a higher qs (uq∂qs/∂A).
Note that the ∂qs/∂A expression in the middle of (9) captures the following sequence of eﬀects:
the higher A raises eviction costs, allowing pf to rise by eA; the resulting reduction in qf is
d0
feA; multiplying by Nf gives the reduction in Lf, which equals the increase in Ls; dividing by
Ns then yields the increase in qs.
Since Ns only appears in the qs argument of (8), diﬀerentiation of (7) yields the ﬁrst-order






To interpret this condition, note that since qs = Ls/Ns from (2), maximizing qs means max-
imizing “average” land consumption (total squatter land divided by population). But maxi-
mizing the average requires setting the marginal eﬀect of Ns equal to the average itself, so that
∂Ls/∂Ns = Ls/Ns holds. The LHS of this equality is just the ﬁrst expression in (10) (using
the previous logic), while Ls/Ns is the second expression.
For (9) and (10) to yielda maximum, the relevant second-order conditions must be satisﬁed.
For a simple understanding of these conditions, the maximization problem can be viewed as
9being solved sequentially, with Ns chosen conditional on A and with A then optimized in
a second stage. From this perspective, the second-order conditions will be met if following
requirements are satisﬁed. First, qs from (7) should be a strictly concave function of Ns,
holding A ﬁxed, at least in a neighborhood of the value where the derivative is zero. Then
(10), the ﬁrst-order condition for Ns, will yield a maximum conditional on A. Second, letting
N∗
s(A) be the Ns solution from (10) conditional on A, and letting f(A,Ns) denote the qs
expression in (7), f(A,N∗
s(A)) should be a concave function of A. Then, the optimization
problem involves maximizing u(y −A,qs) subject to the concave constraint qs = f(A,N∗
s(A)).
With the utility function well-behaved, the ﬁrst-order conditions (9) and (10) then jointly
yield a maximum. Whether or not these requirements are satisﬁed depends, of course, on the
properties of the df(·) and e(·) functions.
The solutions for the endogenous variables A, qs, Ns, Ls, Lf and pf depend on the pa-
rameters of the problem: L, N f, ys, yf, k, and the parameters of u(·) and df. But given the
complexity of the model, a general comparative-static analysis yields ambiguous conclusions.
As a result, the next section of the paper presents an example that imposes speciﬁc forms for
the various functions appearing in the optimization problem. Satisfaction of the second-order
conditions can also be veriﬁed under these functional forms.
Before turning to the example, several additional points require discussion. First, in order
for the above solution to make sense, squatting must be “sustainable”: squatters should not be
able to raise their utilityby enteringthe formal housing market. A conditionon parameters that
ensures sustainability is derived for the ensuing example. Second, formal households should
not be able to gain by becoming squatters. This possibility is ruled out by assuming that
squatting carries a strong enough stigma to make it unattractive under any circumstances for
formal households. Such an assumption can be justiﬁed by imagining that formal employers
engage in spatial “redlining” of workers, refusing to give jobs (or oﬀering lower wages) to
individuals living in undesirable areas of the city. See Zenou and Boccard (2000) and Zenou
(2002) for detailed analyses of models with this kind of redlining behavior.
2.3. An example
To develop an example based on speciﬁc functional forms, suppose that squatters and
10formal residents have the common Cobb-Douglas utility function x1−αqα, where 0 < α < 1.
The formal housing demand function is then given by df(pf) ≡ αyf/pf. In addition, let the
eviction-cost function be given by e(A,Ns,k) ≡ kNsA, indicating that eviction cost is propor-
tional to the total defensive expenditures of squatters, ANs, with the proportionality factor
equal to the property-rights parameter k. Then, (7) becomes qs = (1/Ns)(L − αyfNf/kANs),
and, as shown in the appendix, the solutions for the endogenous variables are given by


















These solutions show that squatters devote a fraction α of their income to defensive ex-
penditures. While this outcome is natural given Cobb-Douglas utility, other features of the
solution are somewhat surprising. In particular, the amount of land occupied by squatters, Ls,
equals exactly half of the city’s land area, regardless of squatter and formal income levels, the
strength of property rights, the size of the formal group, or the size of preference parameter
α. Since Lf, the supply of land to the formal market, is also independent of these parameters,
it follows that the formal price pf depends only on the parameters that aﬀect formal demand
(N f, yf, and α), being independent of ys and k. Thus, the extent of squeezing of the formal
market is curiously independent of these two key features of the squatter environment. By
contrast, all of the model’s parameters (aside from L) aﬀect how the ﬁxed squatter land area
is allocated, determining whether the area has a large number of squatters and small plots or,
alternatively, few squatters and large plots. The latter outcome obtains when k or the income
ratio ys/yf is large, or when N f is small.
112.4. Formalization and the impact of squatting on formal households
Because the extent of squeezing of the formal market by squatters is independent of the
model’s parameters, the solution in (11)–(15) tends to obscure the welfare impact of squatting
on formal residents. To highlight that impact, it is useful to ask a broader question that
goes beyond the comparative-static exercise from above. In particular, how does the very
existence of squatting aﬀect formal residents? In other words, if the squatter households were
“formalized,”being forced to pay for the land they occupy, would the original formal households
be better oﬀ? Answering this question will also lead to an analysis of squatter formalization
as a policy option.
To answer the given question, another issue must be addressed ﬁrst: sustainability of the
squatter equilibrium. In order for the equilibrium characterized by (11)–(15) to be sustainable,
squatter households should not be able to gain by individually opting out, switching to formal
residence at the prevailing formal rental price. Using the Cobb-Douglas demand functions, the
x and q consumption levels following such a switch equal (1 − α)ys and αys/pf, respectively.
The condition for the absence of a gain is then
[(1 − α)ys]1−α(αys/pf)α < (ys − A)1−αqα
s . (16)
Note that since A = αys, x consumption is the same on both sides of (16), which implies that
the inequality holds if q is lower after the switch. Substituting for pf and qs from (12) and (15)
and rearranging, (16) reduces to the condition
kL > 2. (17)
Therefore, for the squatter equilibrium to be sustainable, the city land area weighted by the
property-rights parameter should be suﬃciently large.
Using this result, the welfare impact of squatting on formal residents can be derived,
answering the above question. This impact is found by computing the formal price that
would prevail if the equilibrium group of squatter households were formalized, becoming formal
12residents. If that price is lower than the pf solution in (15), then formal residents are harmed
by squatting.
If squatters were formalized, the aggregate demand function for land in the city would be
given by α(Nsys + N fyf)/pf. This demand is larger than the demand from formal households
alone, but formalization also means a doubling of the supply of land to the formal sector, from














Thus, when the squatter equilibrium is sustainable, the formal price would be lower if all
squatters were formalized. As a result, formalization beneﬁts existing formal households.
Note that, with a lower rental price, individual and thus total land consumption by the
original formal households is higher after the squatters have been formalized. Instead of equally
splitting the city’s land area, the original formal residents then occupy an area larger than
L/2, while the original squatters occupy a smaller area. Thus, squeezing of the formal housing
market is relaxed by formalization.
With the total land area occupied by squatters lower after formalization and their num-
ber held ﬁxed by assumption, individual land consumption is lower as well. Given that x
consumption remains the same at (1 − α)ys, it follows that squatters are worse oﬀ following
formalization. Summarizing yields
Proposition 1. Under the maintained functional-form assumptions, formal residents
beneﬁt from formalization of squatter households, indicating that they are harmed by
squatting. Conversely, squatter households are made worse oﬀ by formalization.
Recall that, when (17) holds, a single squatter household is worse oﬀ when it alone is
switched to formal tenure (which leaves the formal price unaﬀected). Proposition 1, however,
13indicates that the welfare of each squatter household falls when the entire group is formalized,
even though this event leads to a decline in the formal price. Interestingly, the sustainability
condition (17) is necessary and suﬃcient for a decline squatter welfare in both cases, even
though they involve diﬀerent formal prices.6
2.5. Ineﬃciency of the squatter equilibrium
While squatters lose when they are formalized, could formal households oﬀer compensation
for this loss while still enjoying a net gain? To address this question, the ﬁrst step is to note
that, since such compensation is just an income transfer, it leaves total income unchanged
and thus has no eﬀect (under Cobb-Douglas preferences) on the price b pf that prevails in the
new equilibrium where everyone is a formal resident. Therefore the analysis can proceed by
computing compensating variations while holding b pf ﬁxed.
The compensating variation for squatters, denoted Cs, equals the addition to income that
allows each squatter household to achieve its original utility in the new equilibrium, and it
satisﬁes
(ys − A)1−αqα
s = [(1 − α)(ys + Cs)]1−α[α(ys + Cs)/b pf]α. (20)












Note that Cs is appropriately positive when the sustainability condition kL > 2 holds, indi-
cating an uncompensated loss from formalization.
Similarly, the compensating variation for formal households, denoted Cf, equals the income
loss that reduces their utility following formalization to the original level, and it satisﬁes
[(1 − α)yf]1−α(αyf/pf)α = [(1 − α)(yf − Cf)]1−α[α(yf − Cf)/b pf]α. (22)












14a positive expression when kL > 2.
In order for compensation of the former squatter households to be feasible, the inequality
NfCf > NsCs (24)
must hold, indicating that the outlay that keeps formal households at their original utility level
is more than suﬃcient to keep former squatters at their original utility. Substituting for Ns





















Since the appendix shows that this inequality is satisﬁed, it follows that formal households
can compensate squatters for the losses they incur in being formalized. Note that if the com-
pensation were designed to keep squatters at their original utility level, each formal household
would contribute an amount equal to T ≡ NsCs/Nf < Cf from (24).
While this result points toward an ineﬃciency verdict in evaluating the squatter equilib-
rium, the economy has two additional stakeholder groups whose welfare must be considered.
Absentee landowners clearly are aﬀected by squatting, and their income in the original equilib-
rium is equal to pfL/2 = αNfyf. Although the rental price falls, the area generating land rent
doubles when the squatters are formalized, yielding total income of b pfL = αNfyf(2/kL + 1).
Subtracting, landowners then enjoy a gain of
b pfL − pfL/2 = 2αNfyf/kL. (26)
Another potential stakeholder group, the recipients of income from squatter defensive ex-
penditures (political operatives, for example), must also be considered. These expenditures,
which equal ANs in total, disappear when the squatters are formalized, resulting in an income
loss of this magnitude for the recipients. Remarkably, however, the lost income of ANs exactly
equals the gain to absentee landowners in (26), as can be seen by substituting the A and Ns
solutions. Therefore, landowners can exactly compensate these income recipients for their loss.
15Summarizing the foregoing results yields7
Proposition 2. The squatter equilibrium is ineﬃcient. In particular, if squatter
households were formalized, the gainers (original formal residents, absentee landowners)
could compensate the losers (former squatters, recipients of defensive expenditures) for
their losses.
Note that another population group, potential squatters who remaininrural areas, is unaﬀected
by the switch and need not be considered.
The ineﬃciency of the squatter equilibrium is, from one perspective, not very surprising.
However, since this ﬁnding requires comparisons of the outcomes under two diﬀerent behavioral
regimes (squatting vs. formal residence), it diﬀers from a typical ineﬃciency verdict, which
focuses on the gain from removing a distortion within a single institutional framework. The
source of the ineﬃciency in the present model is evidently the absence of mutually accepted
transactions between squatters and landowners, which constitutes a market failure that allows
room for general improvement when squatters are formalized.8
Although the model is highly stylized, making the results only suggestive, they do provide a
possible lesson for public policy. Even though Proposition 2 refers to a forcible formalization of
squatters, it implies that formal households could induce squatters to become formal residents
through suitable compensation, after which both groups would be better oﬀ. The analysis thus
suggests that a mutually agreeable transition out of a squatter equilibrium is possible, which
involves income transfers from formal to squatter households.
2.6. Formalization and land servicing
The harmful impact of formalization on squatter households needs to be qualiﬁed given
that formalization programs are almost always accompanied by some degree of improvement
in infrastructure and land servicing, as provided by the local government. In other words,
while formalized squatters tend to incur a loss from their exposure to the market price of land,
they may beneﬁt from improved access to infrastructure and land services. Whether the net
outcome is beneﬁcial depends on the relative intensities of the two eﬀects, as well as on the
ﬁnancing of the policies. In particular, whether the cost of infrastructure improvements should
be recovered from the beneﬁciaries or subsidized has been at the center of a debate for years.
16In practice, the full-cost recovery of slum-upgrading projects may prove diﬃcult (Buckley and
Kalarickal, 2006), so that infrastructure improvements may require subsidies to cover all or
part of the cost.
The model allows a straightforward discussion of infrastructure improvements and land
servicing, ﬁnanced by taxes on the original formal residents. These taxes take the place of
the cash transfers discussed above. Suppose that formal occupancy requires servicing of the
land, at a cost of g per household.9 Before formalization of the squatters, formal households
pay only for the servicing of their own land through taxes, so that their budget constraint is
g+xf+pfqf = yf. Assuming that land servicesare a perfect substitute for x consumption (recall
that x is a composite, non-housing good), formal utility is then u(g+xf,qf) = u(yf −pfqf,qf),
leaving the objective function of formal households the same as without land servicing. If
formal households were to pay an additional tax of t to ﬁnance provision of services on former
squatter land, utility would become u(yf − t − pfqf,qf).
The magnitude of the tax t depends on the level of these services, denoted h. While h could
equal g, indicating equal service provision throughout the city, h < g would hold if inferior
services are provided to formalized land. Given h, the tax on the original formal households
must then equal t = Nsh/Nf.
The servicing expenditure of h eﬀectively increases x consumption for the former squatters
and helps to oﬀset the utility loss from facing the market price of land.10 If h > Cs from
(21), then the beneﬁts from land servicing are more than enough to oﬀset this loss. However,
if h < Cs holds, then the original formal households must oﬀer an additional cash transfer
of r = NsCf/Nf − t to induce squatters to accept formalization. Instead of paying t, their
payment is then t + r = NsCf/N f ≡ T.
This discussion shows that the land servicing requirement has no eﬀect on the preceding
analysis, with the required servicing outlay simply encompassed in the transfer from formal to
squatter households.11 Note, however, that this conclusion is overturned if the tax required
to support servicing costs exceeds the amount formal households are willing to pay for for-
malization (if t > Cf). Then, voluntary formalization cannot occur unless additional outside
resources can be found for squatter compensation.12
172.7. Squatting on government or marginal land
Squatters often occupy land that is government-owned or marginal in quality, where evic-
tion is less of a threat than on prime land. The model applies to this case as well, under a
particular assumption. To see the argument, let Lg denote the amount of vacant government
land in the city (alternatively, this could be land of marginal quality). Assuming the threat of
eviction is low on such land, it will be fully occupied by squatters. But suppose the gains from
squatting are suﬃcient to induce occupation of some prime land as well, with the amount of
such land denoted e Ls, which satisﬁes e Ls + Lg = Ls. Then, the no-eviction constraint (5) be-
comes relevant, and the previous equilibrium conditions again apply. This argument assumes,
however, that the squatters occupying government land are required by the organizer to make
the same defensive outlay A as squatters on prime land, even though their eviction threat is
lower, while also consuming a plot of the same size. These requirements are plausible given
that the totality of defensive expenditures by squatters, both on prime and government land,
may be relevant in deterring the eviction threat on prime land.
3. Uncontrolled Squatter Migration
3.1. Basic analysis
So far, the squatter population size has been controlled by the organizer, who has the
power to limit migration into the city. Since this assumption may be unrealistic, however, it is
useful to explore the case where migration cannot be controlled. In this case, Ns is no longer
a decision variable of the squatter organizer, who now chooses A to maximize (8) viewing Ns
as parametric (satisfying (9)).13 The previous ﬁrst-order condition (10) for Ns is replaced by
a new equilibrium condition, which says that squatter utility equals e u, the prevailing level in
rural areas:
(ys − A)1−αqα
s = e u, (27)
where qs is given by (7). Thus, squatter migration will proceed up to the point where the gain
relative to rural living is exhausted. Note that the squatter organizer attempts to maximize
utility through choice of A even though migration ultimately forces utility down to the rural
18level. Eqs. (27) and (9) determine the values of A and Ns in the uncontrolled-migration
equilibrium.
Unlike in the earlier analysis, closed-form equilibrium solutions are not available for the
controlled-migration case under the functional form assumptions of the example. In addition,
comparative-static analysis of the equilibrium does not produce determinate results. Neverthe-
less, some useful comparisons betweenthe equilibriawith controlled and uncontrolledmigration
can be derived. To begin, consider Figure 1, which shows squatter utility as a function of Ns,
where A has been chosen optimally conditional on Ns (via (9)).14 When the organizer can
control migration, Ns is chosen to maximize squatter utility, leading to the value of N∗
s in the
ﬁgure (equal to (13)) and a utility level of u∗. In the uncontrolled equilibrium, however, the
squatter population expands up to e Ns > N∗
s, exhausting the gain from migration. Note that,
while another value of Ns lying below N∗
s also leads to a squatter utility of e u (see Figure 1),
this outcome represents an unstable equilibrium.15
Relative to the controlled equilibrium, the impact of uncontrolled migration can thus be
analyzed by deriving the eﬀect of a parametric increase in Ns on the remaining variables of the
model. Relying on the example, the ﬁrst step is to derive the impact on defensive expenditures













where Φ and Ω are positive expressions.16 Inspection of (28) shows that ∂A/∂Ns < 0 holds,
indicating that defensive expenditures fall in moving to the uncontrolled-migration equilibrium.
To derive the impact on the formal price, multiplication of (28) by Ns and use of pf = kANs
from (5) yields pf = k(Φ +
√
Φ + ΩNs), an increasing function of Ns. Therefore, the formal
price rises moving from the controlled to the uncontrolled-migration equilibrium, leading to
a decline in the formal land area Lf and an increase in Ls. Thus, uncontrolled migration
leads to greater squeezing of the formal market, as intuition would suggest. Finally, since
u(ys − A,qs) = e u < u∗ holds while A falls, it follows that qs must be lower with uncontrolled
19migration. Note that the increase in Ns oﬀsets this decline in qs, leading to the increase in the
squatter land area. Summarizing yields
Proposition 3. In moving from the controlled squatter equilibrium to the uncontrolled-
migration equilibrium, the squatter population Ns rises. In response, defensive expen-
ditures A, the squatter plot size qs, and the formal land area Lf fall, while the squatter
land area Ls and the formal price pf rise. The welfare of formal residents declines.
A sustainability condition is again required to ensure the viability of the uncontrolled-
migration equilibrium. This condition once again requires satisfaction of (16), but given (27),
sustainability reduces to the requirement
e u > [(1 − α)ys]1−α(αys/pf)α, (29)
which must hold at the new equilibrium value of pf. In the absence of closed-form solutions,
however, this condition cannot be reduced to a parametric statement like (17).
With uncontrolled migration, the analysis of squatter formalization diﬀers from the pre-
vious case. While squatters previously required compensation to accept formalization, rural
migrants now receive a utility of e u regardless of the city’s institutional arrangement, given
the unlimited supply of new households at this reservation utility level. As a result, if
squatters were formalized, their equilibrium utility would be unaﬀected. However, assum-
ing that the initial squatter equilibrium was sustainable, the original formal households would
be better oﬀ. This conclusion follows because the new migration equilibrium condition is
e u = [(1−α)ys]1−α(αys/pf)α, which ensures that rural migrants, now living in formal housing,
achieve the rural utility level. This condition, which determines pf, yields a value lower than
in any sustainable squatter equilibrium (compare (29)), implying a gain for the original formal
residents. So even though formal residents would be willing to pay squatters to formalize, the
squatters themselves require no compensation, at least in equilibrium.
The two other stakeholder groups, however, would again be aﬀected by formalization.
While the recipients of income from defensive expenditures would again lose, the eﬀect on
absentee landowners is ambiguous in the absence of closed-form solutions. Assuming that
20losses within these two stakeholder groups can be compensated (possibly with help from formal
residents), the previous ineﬃciency verdict would again apply.
3.2. Numerical solutions for the uncontrolled-migration case
Given the absence of closed-form solutions in the uncontrolled-migration case, it is useful
to compute numerical solutions instead. Such solutions can indicate some of the comparative-
static properties of the squatter equilibrium, while allowing the sustainability condition to be
checked. In addition, the solutions allow a more-deﬁnite verdict on the ineﬃciency of the
squatter equilibrium.
The base case for the simulation assumes the following parameter values: α = 0.4, ys =
0.5, yf = 3, k = 1, L = 10, N f = 5, e u = 0.4. Given the stylized nature of the model,
assignment of parameter values must be completely arbitrary, a fact reﬂected in these choices.
The ﬁrst ﬁnding from the simulations is that the sustainability condition is satisﬁed both
for these parameters values and for values in a wide neighborhood containing them. The
second ﬁnding is that, in this neighborhood, formalization of squatter households raises the
total income of landowners, with their gain being larger than the income loss for recipients
of defensive expenditures. Therefore, within the given parameter neighborhood, formalization
can make all stakeholders at least as well oﬀ as in the squatter equilibrium, indicating the
ineﬃciency of that equilibrium.
While the stylized model and arbitrary nature of the parameter choices makes exhaustive
reporting of numerical comparative-statics inappropriate, it is interesting to consider the eﬀect
of changes in one key parameter: the property-rights parameter k. Variation in this parameter
had no eﬀect on the squeezing of the formal market in the controlled-migration model, but an
impact emerges with uncontrolled migration. Table 1 shows how moving from a weak property-
rights regime (k = 1.2) to a stronger regime (k = 1) aﬀects the values of the endogenous
variables (other parameters are held at their base-case values). As intuition would suggest,
stronger property rights, which lower the cost of evicting squatters, limit the squeezing of the
formal market. A decrease in k from 1.2 to 1 reduces the formal price pf, beneﬁting formal
residents. The formal land area Lf expands, and the squatter area Ls shrinks. The squatter
population Ns falls as k drops, while defensive expenditures A rise, reducing x consumption.
21Moving along the ﬁxed e u indiﬀerence curve, individual squatter land consumption qs then rises.
These results suggest an interesting possibility: if property rights could be strengthened
through costly institutional investment by formal residents, the gain from reduced squeezing of
the formal market may be large enough to make such expenditures worth undertaking. Indeed,
if the per capita cost of achieving a level k for the property-rights parameter were given by the
smoothly decreasing function c(k), then the “optimal” stringency of property rights would be
achieved when −c 0(k) equals the dollar value of the utility gain from the marginal reduction
in squeezing. For a fully developed model of this kind of “investment” in property rights, see
Kumar (2007).
4. Conclusion
This paper has oﬀered a new theoretical approach to urban squatting, reﬂecting the view
that squatters and formal residents compete for land within a city. The key implication of this
view is that squatters “squeeze” the formal market, raising the price paid by formal residents.
The squatter organizer, however, ensures that this squeezing is not too severe, since otherwise
the formal price will rise to a level that invites eviction by landowners. Because eviction is
thus absent in equilibrium, the model diﬀers crucially from previous analytical frameworks,
where eviction occurs with some probability.
The main policy lesson of the model is that formalization of squatter households can make
both squatters and formal residents better oﬀ. Formal residents are willing to pay for the
reduction in squeezing that accompanies formalization, and the analysis shows that they can
pay enough to compensate squatters for their loss in the transition to formal tenure. In practice,
this payment could come in the form of infrastructure investments in squatter areas, ﬁnanced
by taxes on formal households. An important implication of this ﬁnding is that squatter
formalization may not require external funding from international agencies. Gains to formal
households could be suﬃcient to allow funds to be raised through voluntary transfers within
the city.
The model is stylized, and future work could be devoted to relaxing some of its assumptions.
For example, instead of having a ﬁxed land area, the supply of urban land could be elastic, a
22modiﬁcation that should leave the main lessons of the analysis unaﬀected. Housing investment
could be added to the model by allowing both formal and squatter households to add capital to
the land. While self-construction is literally an accurate portrayal for squatters, this approach
is equivalent in the formal sector to a model where housing developers build structures. Again,
the lessons of the analysis would be unaﬀected by this embellishment.
While the model currently views all households as renters, resident landownership would
be another useful modiﬁcation (replacing absentee ownership). In this case, formal residents
would own all the land in the city, paying rent to themselves for the land they occupy while
receiving no rent from squatters. Formalization of squatters would then boost the rental
income of the original formal residents, an eﬀect not currently present in the model. Note that
formalization in this context could alternatively require squatters to purchase the land they
occupy from the formal owners, making a large lump sum payment rather than a stream of
rental payments. This type of formalization has been observed in Buenos Aires (see Galiani
and Schargrodsky, 2004, and Di Tella et al., 2007). While squatters would then acquire title to
the land, another approach would be much more lenient: squatters could receive title without
any formal payment, an outcome that would clearly beneﬁt them (defensive expenditures could
cease).
An additional modiﬁcation would recognize that squatters beneﬁt formal households by
oﬀering complementary, low-skill services in the labor market. This eﬀect, which would cause
the formal income ys to rise with the size of the squatter population, would aﬀect the equilib-
rium value of Ns. However, it would not alter the analysis of formalization, which holds the
squatter population ﬁxed.
Finally, a last extension could modify the model’s extreme view of formalization by ana-
lyzying an intermediate case, where only a portion of the squatter population is formalized.
Such partial formalization will aﬀect the welfare of both the original formal households and the
remaining squatters, adding new dimensions to the analysis. Given the importance of squat-
ting as a worldwide phenomenon, this kind of additional theoretical work, as well as further
well-targeted empirical research, deserves high priority.
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A1. Solving for the squatting equilibrium under the example












and the ﬁrst-order conditions for A and Ns ((9) and (10)) reduce to
−(1 − α)(LNsA2 − βN fA) + α(ys − A)βN f = 0 (a3)
βN f/AN2
s − (L − βN f/ANs)/Ns = 0. (a4)
Rearrangement of (a4) yields
ANs = 2βN f/L, (a5)
and substitution in (a3) yields A = αys after rearrangement. Substitution of this A solution
into (a5) then yields Ns, and further substitution into the constraints of the problem gives
solutions for the remaining variables.
To verify satisfaction of the second-order conditions, note ﬁrst that the second derivative of
(a1) with respect to Ns is negative when evaluated at the Ns solution (conditional on A) given
by (a5). Therefore, conditional on A, qs is a strictly concave function of Ns near the value
where the derivative is equal to zero, as required for the ﬁrst-order condition in (a4) to yield
a maximum. Next, note that solving (a5) for Ns conditional on A, and then substituting the
result into (a1), yields qs = L
2
A/4Nfβ, a linear function. Thus, under the two-stage view of
24the optimization problem, the (well-behaved) utility function is being maximized with respect
to A in the second stage subject to a linear constraint, ensuring that the resulting ﬁrst-order
condition yields an optimum.
A2. The sign of (25)






































































The series of terms following the 1 inside the large brackets in (a6) is less than unity, estab-
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Figure 1: The uncontrolled-migration equilibrium Table 1
The Eﬀect of Property-Rights Strengthening
with Uncontrolled Migration
Weak Property Rights Strong Property Rights
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1Alternatively, the squatter organizer’s objective could to be to maximize his own proﬁt (ex-
torting money from squatters while devoting part of that money to defensive expenditures).
Whether community organizers are considered benevolent agents or rent seekers would not
greatly change the qualitative implications of the model.
2De jure formalization is not the only type of possible intervention in squatter settlements.
Other types of interventions, such as street addressing (Farvacke et al., 2005) may simply
seek the de facto recognition of occupancy (see Durand-Lasserve and Selod, 2007, for more
details). Other direct interventions consist of improving the housing and living conditions
of squatters (for a discussion of slum upgrading, see Lall et al., 2008).
3The city’s rental income is then spent elsewhere, with local incomes having no rental-income
component.
4It could be argued that a very large population size reduces the cohesion of the squatter
group, causing eviction cost to fall with Ns at large values.
5An alternate approach would be to assume that the e function gives the eviction cost for
an entire squatter parcel, not per unit of land. Then, (5) would be replaced by pfqs ≤
e(A,Ns,k), with the LHS giving the formal rent that would be earned by the squatter
parcel. This alternate formulation yields conclusions very similar to those reached using (5)
while introducing some additional complexity.
6This conclusion can also be seen by evaluating (16) with b pf in place of pf. Note that while
(16) previously reduced to kL > 2, (16) with b pf in place of pf reduces to kL > 4/(2/kL+1).
Since the RHS of the last inequality exceeds 2 when kL > 2, the inequality is satisﬁed by a
narrower margin, indicating the loss from switching to formal residence is smaller when the
rental price is lower, at b pf. But after rearrangement, the inequality reduces to kL > 2, the
29original sustainability condition.
7This result and the subsequent Proposition are conditional on the maintained functional-
form assumptions.
8To put this result into context, observe that the literature on land tenure formalization,
both for rural areas (see Feder et al., 1988, Feder and Nishio, 1998, and Deininger, 2003)
and for urban areas (see Field, 2005 and 2007, Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2004, Di Tella et
al., 2007), exclusively focuses on some speciﬁc potential consequences of land titling such as
capital investment, labor market participation or health improvement. None of these works
focuses on the redistribution eﬀects of formalization in a uniﬁed land-market framework.
9This cost is the annualized capital cost of infrastructure plus the recurring cost of services.
10It can easily be checked that the equilibrium land price is the same as in the case without
land services, a consequence of the fact that the provision of services is equivalent to a cash
transfer.
11Observe that an alternative way of modeling the beneﬁts of improved infrastructure to for-
malized households could relax the assumption of perfect substitution between services and
x consumption. For instance, preferences could be represented by a separable utility function
of the form u(x,q) + v(g). Assuming that v0(0) is large, formalized squatters would receive
a large beneﬁt from even a small level of services as opposed to none at all. Under this new
assumption, only a small transfer from formal households would be required to compensate
formalized households for their exposure to market prices. It might even be the case that
no transfer at all is needed, so that formalized households would gain even when bearing
the full cost of services themselves. Even though no resource transfers to squatters would
then be required for formalization, the government must play an active role by oﬀering land
services. A dysfunctional government might fail to do so, blocking what would otherwise be
a frictionless transition out of a squatter equilibrium.
12This diﬃculty could perhaps be addressed by a reduction in h, but the t associated with
minimum possible servicing expenditure could still be larger than formal households are
willing to pay. It should also be noted that a more complex analysis would acknowledge
the links between the spatial extent of a city’s infrastructure network, the development of
land, and squatting. In a situation where public resources for infrastructure provision are
constrained, landowners who can successfully lobby the local government to get their land
serviced would make it available for formal development, whereas those who are unsuccessful
would keep the land undeveloped, encouraging squatting. Since landlord eﬀorts in lobbying
for infrastructure provision depend on the price of formal land, and since that price is
aﬀected by the squeezing eﬀect from squatting, this more complex model would yield results
comparable to those obtained using the current approach.
3013It can be shown that the second-order condition for choice of A conditional on Ns is satisﬁed
under the example. The second total derivative of utility with respect to A, holding Ns
ﬁxed, is globally negative.
14Note that this sequence is the reverse of the two-stage sequence discussed earlier in deriving
the second-order conditions (choice of Ns conditional on A followed by choice of A).
15Figure 1’s curve relating squatter utility to Ns must have a local maximum at N∗
s given
satisfaction of the second-order conditions for the controlled-migration case.
16These expressions are given by Φ = (1 − 2α)αysyfN f/[2(1 − α)kL] and Ω = α2ysyfN f/[(1 −
α)kL].
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